A national strategy for

Enhancing the Safety and Security of our Food Supply

Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection

A joint Industry and Government initiative supported by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
A national strategy for

Enhancing
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Food Supply
About the Trusted Information Sharing Network

The Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection allows critical infrastructure owners and operators to share information on important issues, such as business continuity, consequence management, and threats and vulnerabilities, at a national level.

The network is made up of Infrastructure Assurance Advisory Groups for a number of different business sectors. These groups are overseen by the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council, which provides advice to the federal Attorney-General on the national approach to critical infrastructure protection. The Council has also set up Expert Advisory Groups to provide advice on specific areas of interest.

The Council is made up of the representatives of each of the sector groups, representatives from each of the States and Territories, relevant Australian Government agencies and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee.

As part the Trusted Information Sharing Network, the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group was established with the role of improving the security of the food supply chain in the new global security environment. The Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department is a key stakeholder and supporter of the work of the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group.

Secretariat support for the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group is provided by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
Executive Summary

Our food industry is a large and vital part of the Australian economy. It is a major contributor to our social, economic and political wellbeing, creating important business opportunities and employment, especially in rural and regional areas. It is an essential element of our national infrastructure.

Australia’s agricultural and food industries are constantly striving to meet new and emerging market requirements. We pride ourselves on our high safety and security standards and the quality of the products we offer to the global market. While there is always room for improvement, we believe our food safety and security systems are among the best in the world.

Now however, the issue of security has a new dimension. The global security environment has changed, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001. The new business reality now includes the risk of deliberate, politically motivated intervention. Following the September 11, 2001 and Bali bombing events, a government – industry partnership initiative, the Trusted Information Sharing Network for the protection of our critical infrastructure, was established. The food supply chain has been recognised as part of our national critical infrastructure and The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group was formed in 2003 as part of the Network. The membership of the Group is shown at Annex A.

Our food safety and security systems and our food regulatory arrangements are primarily aimed at preventing and detecting natural or accidental risks. The new challenge is to ensure these systems are now capable of responding to the new increased potential for acts of deliberate and malicious intervention in the food supply, a possibility recognised and raised world-wide by the World Health Organisation.

The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group has undertaken a strategic assessment of the food safety and security arrangements to identify potential gaps and vulnerabilities in the event of acts of deliberate and malicious intervention. As a result of this assessment, the Group has developed this strategy to address the key gaps and vulnerabilities identified. Actions needed to enhance our preparedness to respond to the potential for acts of deliberate and malicious intervention are identified under six themes:

• Communication and Consultation
• Coordination
• Prevention
• Preparedness
• Response
• Recovery

The strategy recognises that the food supply chain is potentially at risk and vulnerable. It also acknowledges that it is neither possible nor economically sensible to attempt to deal with every risk. However, it does recognise that in the new global security environment, there is a need to be ever mindful of new and emerging risks. It recognises the need to encourage an awareness of these new risks and the need to sustain a culture of security awareness across all sectors of the industry.
Introduction

Australia’s agricultural and food industries are constantly striving to meet new and emerging market requirements and consumer expectations for assurances about the safety and quality of their products. The events of September 11, 2001 have created a new global security environment. Security is now the new business reality and assurances about the security of the food supply chain are now being called for.

A range of industry operated systems such as due date labelling, tamper proof and tamper evident packaging, traceback systems and recall arrangements and government regulatory arrangements under the national Food Standards Code are already in place to assist industry in meeting current expectations for safety and quality. These arrangements, including good business management practices and corporate governance arrangements, provide a high degree of security preparedness. It is widely recognised that meeting the cost of these requirements is an integral part of doing business in today’s global food market.

However, these arrangements are primarily designed to provide protection against natural or accidental risks to the food supply chain leaving our food supply chain potentially vulnerable to deliberate attack.

New and disturbing risks have arisen in protecting agriculture and food production following the September 11, 2001 and Bali bombing incidents. Currently, the primary aim of terrorists is to cause maximum death and destruction using highly visible acts that terrorise, intimidate and destabilise national confidence by threatening social and economic wellbeing. At the same time, alternate capabilities using emerging technologies that hold prospects of achieving these aims by other means are also being explored. There is a possibility that attention may be directed to economic targets such as agriculture and food industries. This possibility has been raised world-wide by the World Health Organisation, which states: “The prospect of malicious contamination of food for terrorist purposes is a real and current threat.”

Food is Critical to Our National Social and Economic Wellbeing

To improve Australia’s preparedness for a range of possible business interruptions, including possible terrorist acts, an industry government partnership, the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), has been established to improve protective and preventive security arrangements for our critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. More information about the TISN is provided at Annex B.

The food industry is a large and vital part of the Australian economy. In 2004-05, total consumer expenditure on food and liquor was nearly $92 billion, around 46 percent of total Australian retail turnover. The value of Australian food exports in the same year was $24 billion, 18.8 percent of total Australian merchandise exports. Australia is a net exporter of food with an export surplus of $17.5 billion over imports of $6.5 billion.

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Food processing is Australia’s largest manufacturing industry generating total sales of around $66 billion. Exports of $24 billion generated around 21 per cent of total sales.

The food sector, including production, processing, manufacturing, distribution and retail, employs more than 1.1 million people. The majority of these jobs are in regional and rural Australia. The sector is a major contributor to our social, economic and political wellbeing and a significant element of our national infrastructure.

Food is different from most other elements of our infrastructure. Australia enjoys access to a wide range of food products from a diverse range of production areas, processors, manufacturers and retailers. The supply of food is not reliant on any individually significant production facilities. Indeed, while devastating for the business affected, the destruction of physical facilities is most unlikely to have a catastrophic impact on our food supply. What is critical in the food chain is the food itself and public confidence that it can be safely eaten. Deliberate contamination of the food supply has the potential to threaten public health through injury or death and undermine confidence in the safety of the food consumed and supplied to our export customers. The mere threat or claim of contamination has the potential to undermine confidence and cause instability. Maintaining a secure food supply is an essential component of the fabric of our society, underpinning our national social and economic wellbeing.

For Australia’s agriculture and food industries, safety and security are seen as integrated concepts. “Outbreaks of both unintentional and deliberate food borne illness can be managed by the same mechanisms. A comprehensive approach including sensible prevention, preparedness, response and recovery measures constitutes the most efficient and effective way of countering all such emergencies, including food terrorism.” Identifying and managing risk through an ‘all hazards’ approach is a basic tenet of good business practice and corporate governance, equally relevant in the agriculture and food industries as any other. “All segments of the food industry could develop security and response plans for their establishments, proportional to the threat and their resources.”

Australians already enjoy the benefits of a comprehensive food safety system the envy of many other countries. However, Australian agriculture and food businesses exporting to the US are already being required to put in place systems that meet heightened US standards for security and it is likely more could be required including for other key export markets. While new requirements will create unavoidable cost pressures and add complexity to industry arrangements, they also provide an opportunity to better integrate Australia’s food safety, security and emergency response systems to be well prepared.

The new security environment requires that both industry and governments cooperate in ensuring the resilience and robustness of the system that currently exists to maintain the safety and security of the food supply chain.

The Need for a Strategy

If Australia’s agriculture and food industries are to continue to be able to provide assurances about the safety and security of products supplied to their domestic and export consumers, both industry and governments need to cooperate on actions to ensure the maintenance of a safe and secure food supply chain.

5 Ibid
Market confidence in the safety and security of the food supply chain will ultimately be achieved by industry and governments working cooperatively to ensure the robustness of the food chain safety and security system in dealing with the new and emerging threats posed by the new security environment.

**Industry and government agree that a strategy is needed** to ensure that the existing food chain safety and security system is capable of dealing with and responding to natural, accidental and deliberate risks and threats to the food supply chain in an ‘all hazards’ approach.

The scope of the strategy encompasses the food supply chain from agricultural production of food commodities and ingredients through to manufacturing, distribution and sales. It includes fresh and processed food products and beverages.

The strategy also recognises the critical interdependence of the food supply chain on a number of key support and service sectors such as transport, water and energy in maintaining the integrity and the productive capacity of the food supply chain.

The safety and security of the food supply chain relies on sound risk management planning and preparedness supported by well-tested response and recovery arrangements. This Strategy comprises actions under six integrated themes needed to address gaps and potential vulnerabilities in the food safety and security arrangements. The potential risks to the food supply chain and its vulnerability requires successful action on each theme to underpin the achievement of the aim.

**The Aim**

The aim of the Strategy is to enhance the safety and security of Australia’s food supply.

**Achieving the Aim**

Setting this aim recognises that the food supply chain is vulnerable and potentially at risk. While it is neither possible nor economically sensible to attempt to deal with every risk, the new global security environment creates the need to be ever mindful of new and emerging risks. It recognises the need to encourage an awareness of these new risks and the need to sustain a culture of security awareness across all sectors of the industry.

The importance of the food supply chain to Australia’s national social and economic wellbeing underscores the importance of achieving a high level of safety and security. Effective communication and consultation are important considerations at all stages of the emergency management process and underpin effective coordination of the efforts of both industry and governments. A pervasive culture of risk assessment and risk mitigation planning and ensuring that both industry and governments have the appropriate tools in place to deal with new and emerging threats and risks are fundamental.

Measures to detect and deter efforts to contaminate the food supply chain establish an essential first line of defence. Well-established and tested strategies and plans to deal quickly and effectively with incidents of contamination or food borne illness minimise the impact of incidents and sustain confidence. Having access to the right capabilities and resources in the right place at the right time underpin the effectiveness of good preparation and planning. Business continuity planning is important in minimising the impact of an incident and in maintaining production and supply.
The Six Themes

1. Communication and Consultation

Communication and consultation are important considerations at each stage of the risk management planning process. They provide the means for engaging stakeholders in the decision making process and providing a pool of information and expertise to enable the sharing of information and the development of appropriate solutions. “Communications and consultation develop resilience amongst stakeholders and communities and is invaluable in regaining control of critical infrastructure during extreme risk events.”

Where there is a risk to public health and safety, effective and timely communication and consultation with consumers is also important in ensuring the maintenance of consumer and market confidence. An open and transparent approach to risk communication should be used to gain and maintain trust.

Actions

Actions and activities to improve communications and consultation capabilities include:

• Reviewing and improving existing networks with key stakeholders.
• Engaging stakeholders in raising awareness about new and emerging risks.
• Sharing information for the development of effective mitigation and response strategies.
• Improving communication arrangements for responding to incidents.
• Developing strategies for effective risk communication with consumers to maintain consumer and market confidence.

2. Coordination

Effective coordination of the combined efforts and resources of industry and governments is essential. It ensures resilience and robustness in the food safety and security system to deal with new and emerging threats and risks. The coordination effort required covers the full range of risk management activities.

Actions

Actions and activities to improve coordination include:

• Providing leadership and support to businesses in adopting best practice risk assessment and risk management planning and in developing appropriate risk mitigation strategies.
• Encouraging the adoption of preventative mitigation strategies throughout the food supply chain.
• Adopting industry systems that will aid detection of deliberate attack.

3. Prevention

Prevention is a key element of the existing food safety and security system. Significant resources are already invested in reducing the risks of both natural and accidental contamination of the food supply. These arrangements now need to be reviewed and improved to deal with the increased risk of deliberate contamination.

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Actions
Actions and activities to improve the existing measures for preventing deliberate attempts to
contaminate the food supply include:

• Encouraging the inclusion of deliberate intervention considerations such as terrorism or sabotage
in corporate governance and quality assurance programs. This includes, but is not limited to:
  - awareness raising and training to ensure individuals become familiar with deliberate
    intervention issues specific to their function;
  - reviews of existing logistics and supplier arrangements;
  - enhancing food safety and security assessments using independent and qualified auditors; and
  - encouraging security checks or heightened supervision for individuals working within the food
    supply chain and who have access to sensitive information, critical facilities, significant
    contaminants, or have direct access to food.

4. Preparedness
Preparedness involves the continuous development and assessment of plans and capabilities to deal
with an incident or its impact. Fortunately, the measures needed to deal with either an accidental
or deliberate food contamination incident are essentially the same with significant capabilities
already in place. The challenge will be to differentiate one from the other with scale a likely key
factor and the impact of legal considerations in the event of a deliberate incident. The new security
environment now calls for a comprehensive reassessment of preparedness arrangements.

Actions
Actions and activities to improve preparedness include:

• Developing and maintaining plans and protocols (by way of scenario based exercises) that allow
  food supply chain participants to be prepared for new and emerging threats and risks including:
  - food supply chain response plans involving industry, government and consumers;
  - food supply chain recovery strategies, including recovery of food quality and quantity as well
    as recovery in consumer and market confidence in the food supply chain; and
  - safety and security audit and assurance programs to ensure risk treatment and mitigation
    strategies are regularly reviewed.
• Undertaking regular food supply chain safety and security exercises to assess plans and
  arrangements.
• Developing a common operational understanding of issues such as detection technology and
timing, as well as building a portfolio of required capabilities.

5. Response
Response arrangements are designed and implemented to minimise the effects of an incident and to
provide immediate relief and support to people affected by it. Rapid detection and identification
of any contaminant, the affected product and isolating supplies are essential. The support
of the national analytical laboratory network will be essential in facilitating these actions. There are
also a number of potentially conflicting interests involved in a food contamination incident especially
where the incident is deliberate and/or terrorist related. These interests need to be identified and
addressed prior to any incident.
**Actions**

Actions and activities to be undertaken to improve response arrangements include:

- Encouraging an enhanced and integrated national food supply chain surveillance, diagnostic, and laboratory services network that includes:
  - a comprehensive understanding of the network’s capabilities and capacity including the capabilities to test for “novel” or “innovative” contaminants;
  - development of cost effective screening systems supporting rapid diagnosis;
  - strengthening linkages between industry and government laboratories and health networks;
  - encouraging laboratories to report “unidentified analytical responses” and incidents that may appear to be deliberate to state or territory health authorities; and
  - developing a more rigorous approach to identifying research and development priorities through a capability gap analysis as well as aligning, where possible, sampling, detection, and diagnostic protocols and procedures.

- Reviewing rapid response protocols to ensure they consider issues associated with terrorism including:
  - jurisdictional and commercial complications such as security, privacy, commercial-in-confidence issues, consequence management accountabilities, brand protection, insurance implications and emergency funding arrangements.

**6. Recovery**

Recovery from a food contamination incident involves restoration of a safe supply of the affected food and confidence in the food supply as quickly as possible. Many of the capabilities required to implement effective responses to incidents are the same as those required to support recovery procedures, particularly in relation to laboratory support.

**Actions**

A number of actions and activities are needed to improve our recovery capabilities. These include:

- The actions described in the Response theme for improving the national laboratory services network.
- Supporting research and encouraging developments for improved abilities to trace food, ingredients, and products through the food supply chain including:
  - improved product integrity systems that support improved safety and security and provide enhanced capabilities to track and trace product; and
  - reviews of protocols and procedures to ensure contaminated or suspect product is appropriately handled, disposed of and fully accounted for.
The Way Forward

The Strategy and Actions contained in this document will assist both governments and food businesses in improving the safety and security of the food supply chain in the new global security environment. Safety and security are seen as integrated concepts for our food and agriculture industries. And we share responsibility for ensuring safety and security measures are in place as the result of adequate and appropriate risk management.

From an ‘all hazards’ perspective, the measures needed to deal with the consequences of a deliberate intervention are the same as those used to handle an accidental or natural event.

Australian governments are constantly reviewing and improving our prevention, preparedness and response arrangements. At the same time, our industries are being encouraged to review the adequacy and appropriateness of their risk management arrangements.

Terrorism is only one of the risks businesses need to consider as an integral part of good business practice. To be effective, risk management should become part of an organisation’s culture. In an ‘all hazards’ approach to risk management, the measures adopted to deal with criminals trying to interfere with business operations will often be enough to deal with the terrorist risk.

Our joint aim is to be better prepared to deal with the increasing challenges to the safety and security of our food supply chain. Raising awareness about the threat and encouraging adequate and appropriate risk management practices in a sensible, integrated way will enable us to work together in achieving our aim.

Implementation

Achieving the required improvements under the six themes identified is a joint industry and government responsibility as detailed in Table1 – Implementing the Identified Actions. The key mechanisms to be used include:

• A comprehensive program to raise awareness of the threat and risks to the food supply and for sharing information about effective critical infrastructure protection practices involving both industry and government. The program will include workshops with both industry and government agencies, and presentations at appropriate seminars, conferences and other industry forums.

• The development of education and training materials to assist food businesses in understanding and implementing food security risk assessment and risk mitigation planning.

• Close participation in the work and activities of the wider Trusted Information Sharing Network to access the potential benefits of:
  - support and assistance through information sharing on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) issues and best practice with other sector groups;
  - technology developments and opportunities for R&D support; and
  - access to generic CIP training initiatives and resources.
Resources

Consideration of the potential risk of deliberate intervention should be an integral part of risk management practice for all food businesses. As the owners and operators of the infrastructure in the food supply chain, industry is expected to invest in appropriate measures to mitigate the assessed risk to their particular product, business or brand. That investment should be consistent with good corporate governance and business practice.

Through the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Government will continue to support and facilitate the work of the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group with secretariat services including:

• providing resource materials for use in industry presentations, workshops and seminars;
• working with other relevant Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies in sharing information and improving our national prevention, preparedness and response arrangements; and
• providing communications support for sharing information about best practice CIP practices with industry.

The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group will also continue to have access to support and assistance from the CIP programs and initiatives administered by the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department.

Review and Evaluation

The Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group will continue to review and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy to ensure it keeps pace with new developments and provides the best possible protection for the Australian people. Further work remains to be done to evaluate and address remaining key issues and the other priority recommendations of the strategic assessment report including:

• interdependencies – the potential impact on the food sector through deliberate interventions in other critical infrastructure sectors;
• new and innovative opportunities for sharing information and raising awareness; and
• identifying research and development requirements to develop new and improved capabilities.
Table 1: Implementing the Identified Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme and Actions</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>• Review and improve existing networks with key stakeholders.</td>
<td>Industry/Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Engage stakeholders in raising awareness about new and emerging risks.</td>
<td>Industry/Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Share information for the development of effective mitigation and response strategies.</td>
<td>Industry/Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improve communication arrangements for responding to incidents.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop strategies for effective risk communication with consumers to maintain consumer and market confidence.</td>
<td>Government/Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Coordination</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide leadership and support to businesses in adopting best practice risk assessment and risk management planning and in developing appropriate risk mitigation strategies.</td>
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<td>• Adopt industry systems that will aid detection of deliberate attack.</td>
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<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Timeline and Progress</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAAG industry members to engage membership more widely on food security issues and considerations to improve and expand where necessary existing communication networks.</td>
<td>DAFF biosecurity workshops program with jurisdictions commenced in 04-05 and ongoing to improve networks and response arrangements including communication issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both industry and government to use all appropriate opportunities to include presentations and workshops on food security issues in conferences, seminars and similar events.</td>
<td>Government risk communicators network established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry and government to include communication issues in food security exercises.</td>
<td>Workshop format and resource materials developed and piloted in 2004. To be continued in 2005 and ongoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and government to include risk management sessions in appropriate forums. Government to assist with information resources. Government and industry to work together in identifying and developing suitable tools to assist business. Industry to identify R&amp;D requirements and share information about effective systems.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and industry to work with providers of training support and food safety systems advice, support and tools to integrate food security considerations into existing food safety systems and tools. Industry and government to also work to develop specific training arrangements and tools where a particular need is identified.</td>
<td>The Australian Food Safety Centre of Excellence has been invited to work with the FCAAG in providing advice on suitability of a US training package and opportunities to integrate food security considerations into existing food safety tools and training materials.</td>
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### 4. Preparedness

- Develop and maintain plans and protocols (by way of scenario based exercises) that allow food supply chain participants to be prepared for new and emerging threats and risks including:
  - food supply chain response plans involving industry, government and consumers;
  - food supply chain recovery strategies, including recovery of food quality and quantity as well as recovery in consumer and market confidence in the food supply chain; and
  - safety and security audit and assurance programs to ensure risk treatment and mitigation strategies are regularly reviewed.

- Undertake regular food supply chain safety and security exercises to assess plans and arrangements.

- Develop a common operational understanding of issues such as detection technology and timing, as well as building a portfolio of required capabilities.

### 5. Response

- Encouraging an enhanced and integrated national food supply chain surveillance, diagnostic, and laboratory services network that includes:
  - a comprehensive understanding of the network’s capabilities and capacity including the capabilities to test for “novel” or “innovative” contaminants;
  - development of cost effective screening systems supporting rapid diagnosis;
  - strengthening linkages between industry and government laboratories and health networks;
  - encouraging laboratories to report “unidentified analytical responses” and incidents that may appear to be deliberate to state or territory health authorities; and
  - developing a more rigorous approach to identifying research and development priorities through a capability gap analysis as well as aligning, where possible, sampling, detection, and diagnostic protocols and procedures.

- Review rapid response protocols to ensure they consider issues associated with terrorism:
  - these protocols should anticipate jurisdictional and commercial complications such as security, privacy, commercial-in-confidence issues, consequence management accountabilities, brand protection, insurance implications and emergency funding arrangements.

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<tr>
<td>Industry and government to continue to review the adequacy of existing plans and protocols to identify gaps and what more may need to be done to improve the current arrangements.</td>
<td>Sectors to provide descriptions of existing plans to establish an inventory of current plans and protocols. Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry to promote the wider adoption of business continuity planning procedures by food businesses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry and government to cooperate in the conduct of exercises to test and trial plans and procedures.</td>
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The capacity and capabilities of the national laboratory system are relevant to a range of sectors and interests. A coordinated national review is underway and incorporates the needs and expectations of key stakeholders. Preliminary study commenced in 2004. A major study is currently underway and is expected to be completed in July 2006.

Regular workshops, seminars and exercises to be undertaken involving both government and industry to review arrangements and monitor progress in implementing improvements. National and regional workshops conducted in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Workshops seminars and exercises will be an ongoing feature of the communication plan for the strategy.
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### Implementation

The capacity and capabilities of the national laboratory system are relevant to a range of sectors and interests. A coordinated national review is underway and incorporates the needs and expectations of key stakeholders.

Industry to review existing arrangements to identify needs and work with government to access R&D support.

### Timeline and Progress

| Preliminary study commenced in 2004. A major study is currently underway and is expected to be completed in July 2006. |
| Ongoing |

| Ongoing |
Annex A

Membership of the Food Chain Assurance Advisory Group

Senior executives of the following industry organisations and government agencies are members of the Group:

Chairperson:
Mr Dick Wells, Chief Executive of the Australian Food and Grocery Council

Members:
Industry
• National Association of Commodity Marketing Associations
• Australian Chicken Meat Federation
• Dairy Australia
• Australian Food and Grocery Council
• Australian Pork Limited
• Australian Seafood Industry Council
• Croplife Australia
• Animal Health Alliance
• Horticulture Australia Limited
• Meat and Livestock Australia
• Australian Meat Industry Council
• National Farmers’ Federation
• Packaging Council of Australia
• Refrigerated Warehouse and Transport Association
• Safefood Queensland
• Coles Myer Limited
• Metcash Limited
• Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
• Australian Food Safety Centre of Excellence
• State and Territory Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council members or their representatives

Australian Government Agencies
• Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
• Department of Transport and Regional Services
• Department of Health and Ageing
• Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources
• Food Science Australia
• Food Standards Australia New Zealand

Australian Government observers
• Attorney-General’s Department including ASIO
• Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

The secretariat to the Group is provided by the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
An increase in the safety and security of our Food Supply

Annex B

Background and Guiding Principles

Ensuring the security of our critical infrastructure has become a major concern for both governments and industry in the new security environment following the 11 September 2001 and Bali bombing incidents. With much of the country’s critical infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector, the Australian, State and Territory governments agreed on the need for a partnership with industry to enable the sharing of security information. This partnership was formed with the setting up of the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program in 2003. The program consists of the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) overseen by the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) and includes Infrastructure Assurance Advisory Groups (IAAGs) to ensure the identification and protection of the critical infrastructure of particular industries or sectors.

The Australian Government Attorney-General's Department established the TISN and the CIAC including the TISN website, www.tisn.gov.au, as an information and networking tool for critical infrastructure protection. The work of the TISN is underpinned by an 'all hazards' approach to addressing risk in the new security environment.

The Food Supply Chain has been identified as part of our critical infrastructure and a Food Chain IAAG (The Food Chain Group) has been established as part of the TISN.

Principles of Critical Infrastructure Protection

One of the key tasks for the CIAC has been the development of a national strategy to guide the work of the TISN that includes an agreed set of principles for critical infrastructure protection.

“CIP requires the active participation of the owners and operators of infrastructure, regulators, professional bodies and industry associations in cooperation with all levels of government, and the public. To ensure this cooperation and coordination all of these participants should commit to the following set of common fundamental principles of CIP. These principles are to be read as a whole, as each sets the context for the following.

1. CIP is centred on the need to minimise risks to public health, safety and confidence, ensure our economic security, maintain Australia’s international competitiveness and ensure the continuity of government and its services.
2. The objectives of CIP are to identify critical infrastructure, analyse vulnerability and interdependence, and protect from, and prepare for, all hazards.
3. As not all critical infrastructure can be protected from all threats, appropriate risk management techniques should be used to determine relative criticality, the level of protective security, set priorities for the allocation of resources and the application of the most efficacious mitigation strategies for business continuity.
4. The responsibility for managing risk primarily rests with the owners and operators.
5. CIP needs to be undertaken from an ‘all hazards approach’ with full consideration of interdependencies between businesses, sectors, jurisdictions and government agencies.
6. CIP requires a consistent, cooperative partnership between the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and governments.
7. The sharing of information relating to threats and vulnerabilities will assist governments, and owners and operators of critical infrastructure to better manage risk.

8. The owners and operators of infrastructure, regulators, professional bodies, industry associations and all levels of government should avoid generating undue concern about national security threats to our critical infrastructure, while accepting that enhanced business continuity planning can be used for product differentiation in the market.

9. Stronger research and analysis capabilities can ensure that risk mitigation strategies are tailored to Australia’s unique critical infrastructure circumstances.